Mini-Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: Implications from Europe and its Role in Resolving Korean Peninsula Issues
Laura Florina Stan 1, Xiuli Chen 2, Yi He 3, Kyung-young Chung 4
1 Ph.D.
Candidate, Department of Korean Studies, GSIS, Hanyang University, Seoul, South
Korea
2 Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Global Strategy, and Intelligence
Studies, GSIS, Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea
3 Ph.D. Candidate, Department of American Studies, GSIS, Hanyang
University, Seoul, South Korea
4 Professor, Department of Korean Studies, GSIS, Hanyang University,
Seoul, South Korea
|
ABSTRACT |
||
Northeast
Asian nations, including the critical historical fulcrum of the Korean
Peninsula, must prioritize regional cooperation and trust-building to achieve
their maximum regional and global potential. Through the study of four stages
of regional growth, a roadmap towards integration that's contextualized
within the unique socio-political dynamics of Northeast Asia is provided. Mini-multilateralism has historical relevance for the
Korean Peninsula whose complexities and sensibilities arising from the
peninsula's divided past underscore the need for a strategy that supports
smaller, more focused multilateral engagements. These engagements could
provide a platform for resolving ongoing tensions while fostering regional
cooperation, ultimately contributing to the construction of a secure
Northeast Asia. The examination of historical incidents, particularly those
related to the Korean Peninsula, shows the immense potential of mini-multilateralism as a strategy for advancing regional
stability, building trust, and promoting cooperation. As such, the
implications drawn from European experiences serve as lessons for Northeast
Asia and particularly for resolving issues related to Korean history and its
future. |
|||
Received 04 February
2024 Accepted 05 March 2024 Published 31 March 2024 Corresponding Author Xiuli Chen, cxlavj@hanyang.ac.kr DOI 10.29121/granthaalayah.v12.i3.2024.5542 Funding: This research
received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial,
or not-for-profit sectors. Copyright: © 2024 The
Author(s). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License. With the
license CC-BY, authors retain the copyright, allowing anyone to download,
reuse, re-print, modify, distribute, and/or copy their contribution. The work
must be properly attributed to its author. |
|||
Keywords: Cultural Community, Historical Incidents,
Security Regime, Trilateral Cooperative Secretariat |
1. INTRODUCTION
Northeast Asia has been undergoing historical evolution,
with its relationship structure constantly changing even amidst the general
backdrop of the Cold War. Notably, in the 1960s, Japan and South Korea resumed
diplomatic relations, and subsequently, Japan and the United States established
diplomatic relations with China in 1972 and 1979, respectively. In 1991, China and USSR signed
the China-Soviet Border Agreement for resolving territorial disputes. South
Korea normalized with Russia and China in 1990 and 1992, respectively. These
adjustments and changes have added new factors and provided new operating space
for the relationship and order in Northeast Asia; in particular, China’s
implementation of the policy of reform and opening-up has promoted the further
development of China-Japan relations and brought the economic ties between the
two countries closer.
In recent years, the
United States has defensively headed for national security to absorb investment and trade policies competing with China, which is a new notion of national security integrating political interests emerging with the ideological, technological,
and economic, leading a trans-formative change
of the
global economic architecture.[1] At the
same time, the need of envisioning Northeast Asian present constraints and
future framework from a broader perspective is becoming more imperative.
However,
Northeast Asia still needs to eliminate the situation of division and
confrontation. In particular, the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea
has complicated regional relations, increasing the risk of accidents. Although
the interactions between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or
North Korea), the
United States (US), and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) have
seen some changes since
the ROK-DPRK Panmunjom Summit in April 2018 and the U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit in June 2018, there are many uncertain factors including historical legacies,
territorial disputes, exclusive nationalism, and digitalization alliance.[2]
Northeast Asia has many
challenges but also great potential at so many levels. To reach regional and
global maximal potential, regional cooperation, and
trust-building should be a priority for Northeast Asian countries. The
hypothesis is that a comprehensible approach for desirable mini-multilateralism
should be developed, involving ideology,
security, economy, culture, and strategic dialogues by learning lessons from European experiences.
Hence, the purpose of studying this topic is twofold. First, it examines
existing mini-multilateralism in Northeast Asia in terms of ideology
(China-Russia-North Korea relations), security (US-Japan-Korea), economy
(China-Japan-Korea). In addition, this study explores an ideal
mini-multilateralism in the region in terms of the circular economy coping with
biodiversity challenges and climate change (China-Japan-South Korea), the five-country
cultural relations (China-Japan-the Two Koreas-US), and the four-country
strategic talks (China- the Two Koreas-US talks).
Therefore,
the following two research questions are investigated in this study. What
lessons can be drawn from history, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to resolve the
constraints in Northeast Asia? How can mini-multilateralism enrich the
cooperative and friendly relations in the region to develop a desirable
mini-multilateralism framework highlighting the circular economic and counter-disaster relief task
force, cultural community, and quad-strategic talks on Taiwan and Korean
issues?
To answer these research
questions, various methods are used, such as historical review, literature
review, issue diagnosis, and future design. The literature review will be used
to define the key concepts and discuss the theoretical framework to establish a
desirable future regional framework, while the case of OSCE is studied to learn
its strengths and weaknesses to develop implications for Northeast Asia.
Lastly, three mini-multilateralism models are discussed to enrich the
cooperative and friendly relations in the region after existing
mini-multilateralism is investigated.
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
2.1. Mini-multilateralism and
Multilateralism
In Western sphere, the current international stage
is said to act under the interdependent rule of neo-liberalism, globalization,
and multilateralism. Nonetheless, this generalization does not apply to all
regions. Northeast Asia somewhat escapes the neoliberal rule, and
multilateralism is not the only way countries can interact.
There are four types of
interaction: unilateralism, bilateralism, multilateralism, and minilateralism (or mini-multilateralism).
Unilateralism and bilateralism were the dominant types of interaction between
entities before the emergence of the Westphalian international system (1648),[3] but
continue to be used in hegemonic systems, respectively bipolar and multipolar
systems, where alliances and balancing power are needed. Unilateralism and bilateralism are similar in that
both are preferential types of interaction and pose the danger of being
discriminatory, favoring the interests of one state,
respectively two. On the other hand, if bilateralism is combined with
multilateralism and minilateralism, it can help boost
cooperation and complex interdependence.[4]
Multilateralism gained momentum
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, together with the Cold War and the
bipolar international system,[5] and “has played a significant role in international
cooperation,”[6]
being a neoliberal instrument of maintaining peace. Through multilateralism,
countries choose to give up the endless neorealist distrust. Robert Keohane, the key figure of neoliberal
institutionalism, portrayed 1990 multilateralism as “the practice of
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.”[7] The common objective is to formally “build trust
and avoid conflict by identifying, institutionalizing and observing rules and
norms for a shared vision of regional or international order.”[8] Multilateral agreements can theoretically enjoy
broad spread effects due to a larger number of participants, strengthen global
governance, and help address complex long-term issues. On the other hand, the
decision-making process can be prolonged, impeding any immediate actions.
However, Europe started from a while already to
show signs of exhaustion at the multilateral level through institutions such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).
Europe is one of many places where multilateralism needs to be revised, while
in Northeast Asia multilateral meetings never even merged into a significant
security regime or even a regional economy-based institution.[9] For Europeans, the alternative
was found in ‘mini-lateral’ cooperation agreements that actually “stem from the
practice of multilateralism.”[10] Mini-multilateralism
is an ideological and conceptual choice in the context of globalization, a
political framework and strategic choice in the process of multi-polarization, and even a multilateral
diplomatic and institutional choice in the democratization of international
relations.[11] The main advantage is that minilateralism
can assist decision-making and alleviate coordination on essential focus field
with only the actors concerned involved. This type works best at a regional
level, which means it is a precious instrument to be used by countries in
Northeast Asia too, in combination with multilateralism. These meetings are more limited in number and
scope, addressing ad-hoc more minor issues that only concern the countries
involved. Mini-multilateralism or minilateralism is
seen as the hope for those areas where multilateralism has failed, being
“likely to offer a promising dynamic even within Europe, despite the many
difficulties they face.[12] And, while the possible value of multilateralism has been
widely proponent by international relations theorists as a preferable code of behaviour in Northeast Asia without
adequately explaining the causal route to multilateralism by commanding the
emergent possession of multilateralism.[13]
2.2. Offensive Realism and Neoliberal
Institutionalism
Because of the continuing division of the Korean
Peninsula, the Northeast Asian region is seen as a “bastion of Cold War realism.”[14]
While the region is indeed haunted by realist political and security decisions,
the international system has changed from bipolar to multipolar, with two
superpowers (the US and China)
and three great regional powers (Japan, Russia, and South Korea). These
players’ politics affect the order not only in the region but also at a global
level.
The strategic competition between China and US is
manifested globally but at the same time, from a security point of view, also
regionally strengthens the region’s inclination towards offensive realism.
According to this theory, countries act in an anarchic international system
with the objective of survival. And, as John Mearsheimer suggested in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
even great powers that are security-seeking will have no other choice but to
compete and engage in conflict with each other, thus “The Tragedy of International Politics.”[15]
Fruitful multilateral meetings in Northeast Asia are made difficult by the
anarchical structure of the system which constrains states to seek alliances
and maximization of power, hence the difficulty to reach a security regime or go forward towards
regional integration. Henry Kissinger has compared Northeast Asia with
post-Napoleonic wars Europe, “in the sense that great power politics (…) are
still competitive while struggling for a way to forge an effective multilateral
mechanism for cooperation.”[16] This has been reflected by the practice of the
balance of power.
Nonetheless, following the
security and economic dimensions, Northeast Asia is balancing offensive realism
at the security level with neoliberalism at the economic level. When states
choose to cooperate under the theory of neoliberal institutions, they admit
that cooperation is possible under the anarchic system, with wealth
maximization for all the actors involved. The nations in Northeast Asia are
interconnected through trade and economic ties, forming patterns of cooperation.[17] Economic
interdependence is often used as a political “weapon” to fulfill
their respective national security interests. While offensive realism is the
reality of today’s Northeast Asia, neoliberal institutionalism is the desirable
perspective to reach for. Northeast Asia already has the potential to overcome
security dilemmas and ideology incompatibilities. Before building a framework
in that sense, in the next chapter, lessons from the European experience will be addressed and
implications to Northeast Asia drawn. The
opportunities arising in the region and the existing challenges will be shown
in more detail at the end.
3. European Experiences and their Implications
The OSCE is an international conference mechanism and
process established by East and West Europe during the Cold War to ease
tensions in the military
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. The
OSCE mainly maintains security through communication
and dialogues. During and after the Cold War, the establishment of trust
and security mechanisms, arms control, and disarmament agreements stabilized
the situation on the European continent, effectively prevented the outbreak of
large-scale wars in Europe, and added to
the political steadiness and economic evolution of European countries.[18] The OSCE provided an essential framework for
pan-European multilateral security dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation,
forming a new concept of comprehensive security and common security, which is concerned with other aspects of
security as well as political and military ones. It includes arms control,
trust and security-building measures, human rights, democracy, minority issues,
counter-terrorism, etc. The comprehensive security
concept shifted people’s vision from focusing on hard power and security to
other fields and factors for the first time. It began to consider security
issues in an all-around way. Thus, the development of OSCE reflects the concept
of cooperative security and is a breakthrough beyond collective security.[19] Along
with the EU, OSCE has been a pillar for peacekeeping and harmonizing potential
conflicting national interests.
3.1. Implications of OSCE to
Northeast Asia
Northeast Asia can learn from the development process of the
OSCE, which has established the
world’s most complete arms control mechanism, trust, and security measures
through negotiations. Under the framework of security cooperation in Northeast
Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, countries in Northeast Asia have made many
efforts to carry out cooperation, enhance mutual trust, and promote
multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Under such a premise, the
Six-Party talks emerged at a historic moment. Although it is still in its
infancy, governments of all the involved countries have reached a profound
consensus on accelerating the development of the security cooperation system in
Northeast Asia.[20] However, the Six-Party
Talks were frozen due to
the failure of the September 19, 2005 Agreement.
Nowadays, Northeast
Asian countries’ understanding of multilateral security cooperation has been
transformed into a positive one as due to the escalating biodiversity challenges and climate change,
regional arms competition, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international counter-terrorism, countries are beginning to have a shared
sense of crisis. At present, all Northeast Asian countries have actively
participated in various multilateral security cooperation organizations. With
the accumulation of experience, all countries have realized the importance of
cooperative security and accumulated experiences in
security cooperation in various aspects in the form of “mini-multilateralism.”[21]
OSCE advocates comprehensive security, common security,
cooperative security, and the corresponding principle of multilateralism,
positive practice preventive diplomacy, as reflected in its security theory and
relatively mature institutional organization management experience, for
complicated geographic structure. Power distribution is not balanced, and the
severe contradiction between great powers in Northeast Asia can borrow from
these mature experiences. At the same time, it will help promote establishing a
security regime in the Asia-Pacific region and create a stable regional
environment conducive to Northeast Asia.
3.2. Implications of EU to Northeast Asia
The purpose of the European Union
was to restore the European economy after the trauma of World War II. The
establishment of the European Union was a political, economic, and military
alliance of European countries to cope with the unpredictable world situation
after the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union.[22] And while the supranational organization structure
of the EU might be unsuitable for developing mini-multilateralism in Northeast
Asia, some of its approaches are worth learning, as the countries of Northeast
Asia still need to overcome the tragic past.
Despite the difficulties in the early postwar period,
European countries have all gone through the industrial revolution, laid a
solid economic foundation, and become developed capitalist regions.[23] The
economic and technological foundation is solid, most countries have high-level
scientific and technological personnel and labor
force with good cultural quality, have experience in managing the economy, as
well as the extensive external economic relations established in history, these
conditions are the main reasons for the rapid economic recovery of Western
Europe.
Nonetheless, because of its
nature, the EU faces constant predicaments. The recent outbreak of the Eurozone
crisis has brought huge losses to the government’s finances, structural
imbalances, and institutional deficiencies. The development of countries within
the Eurozone is unequal. Transferring funds from member states with good fiscal
positions to those with poor ones is problematic.[24] Drawing lessons from the sovereign debt crisis in
the Eurozone and its causes, Northeast Asian monetary cooperation should
further expand the scale of mutual funds, steadily promote assistance tools in
those areas, establish a financial supervision system and rescue withdrawal
mechanism in the region to effectively prevent countries financial and fiscal
risks. It seems essential to strengthen political dialogue and economic
cooperation and steadily promote the development of regional currency cooperation
based on market choices.[25]
The EU has vast funds, has
participated extensively in various forms and levels of dialogue, has
established strategic partnerships, and its influence in the United Nations has
continued to increase, the two forming a partnership dedicated to multilateralism.[26] Mini-multilateralism in
Northeast Asia can also use its advantages to extensively cooperate with the international community to
promote more cooperation and development.
4. Mini-multilateralism Models
4.1. Status
Quo of Northeast Asia
Ideologically, the countries in Northeast Asia subscribe to
different sets of values such as communism
ideology, social democracy, liberal democracy ideology, and nationalism, which
may decrease efficient cooperation. Led by
common frustration with recognized western
restrictions on their geopolitical desire, China and Russia have ceaselessly coincided in their positions on critical regional strategic issues.[27] The outside world sees China, Russia,
and North Korea under the same umbrella of communism. Although all three
countries are similar in the fact that they have strong identities, they cannot
be equaled because of important differences. To these
variances, nationalist sentiments of high intensity are added in the case of China, Japan,
and the two Koreas. This is, in some ways, the
natural consequence of the Westphalian international relations based on
sovereign states and of the growth in great power nationalism, which climaxed
with the two world wars.[28]
The Japan-Republic of Korea-U.S. mini-multilateralism is often discussed in terms of the cooperation
among nations against North Korea. The Six-Party Talks was an effort of the six
main actors involved in the region to reach a peaceful solution concerning the
nuclearization issue and the rogue behavior of North
Korea after its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
2003. In 2019, the importance of the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Defense Cooperation was emphasized, through the Trilateral
National Security Advisors’ Press Statement, the three countries agreeing to
keep up pressure on North Korea.[29] The US White
House has more frequently authorized employing strategic assets in South Korea.
The announcement came as Pyongyang, Seoul,
and Washington conducted unprecedented aerial war games with further Joint Statements made by the US, Japan,
and ROK to condemn NK ballistic missile launches on May 28, 2022.[30]
China, Japan, and South Korea’s mini-multilateralism
should focus mainly on several
common dimensions from various fields. First, to
create an economy and trade community, Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations
should continue and concentrate on the two-track approach to tripartite
agreements, the flexible labor market, and the labor market security sectors in the region. Secondly, direct investment and financial
cohesion are and should be an important emphasis
as continuing cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea based on the signed Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) of 1st of
January 2022,[31] which could push the fulfilment of the trilateral FTA among the
three countries to stress matters not veiled in
RCEP. For example, with the rising pressure to execute
the net-zero government target, both public and private banks will need to
commit to their newest opportunity on overseas renewable energy finance, which
requires the overseas joint energy financing strategies of these
states. Thirdly, in the field of research and
development (R & D), the rise of the semiconductor industry in the Asia
Pacific region involves a broad market and increasing R & D expenditure,
including mainland China,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. A linkage
strategy needs to be established among those major players to work
together to transform Northeast
Asia into the engine of the world economy in the
new digital era.[32]
4.2. Desirable
Mini-Multilateral Models
Ideology, economy, and security might intertwine in some
cases. However,
requirements for inevitability and safety are more powerfully linked to
cultural ideology than economic ideology standards.[33] A
desirable mini-multilateralism in Northeast Asia
requires a balance among ideology, economy, and security, emphasizing the circular economy coping with
biodiversity challenges and climate change, quadrilateral Northeast
Asian Cultural Community, and quadrilateral strategic talks among U.S, China,
and the Two Koreas on Taiwan and Korean issues.
4.2.1. Circular Economy and Counter-Disaster
Relief
To reduce and
reverse biodiversity loss, the approaches
of making, using, and
consuming products and food ought to be
eventually updated to lessen waste and pollution, recycle products and materials, and regenerate nature so that biodiversity can thrive. These are critical to developing society and the modern economy by generating
substantial economic values.[34] Natural resources and the pre-production developed
from
them, establish the physical foundation for the economic system,
triggering attention from
policymakers on a more resource-efficient and
circular economy.[35] The circular economy is being rapidly introduced as a resilient framework to reach this significant upgrading because
of the
values that rebuild
biodiversity by supplying other
society-wide benefits.[36] Circular business models develop tangible benefits to cope with global problems such as climate
change, social
conditions, and challenges to biodiversity[37] through
rethinking
the ways of producing, consuming, and
managing natural resources, which reduces the pressure on environmental biodiversity. Upgrading a
circular economy and a zero-emission society will involve ever-changing
consumption and production design beyond climate action exclusively. The circular approach needs to link homes,
business offices, schools, industrial plants,
marketplace, city corridors,
national organizations, and farms at the local level, whose content engrossment
refers to the need for individual citizens and the broader profession to be involved, endowed, and
comprehend local value and welfare in following zero waste and circular
activities.
China, Japan, and South
Korea have already
got national strategies for enabling the
circular economy. In 2008, China authorized its law to decrease, reprocess and re-utilize domestic waste and industrial by-products,
which has endowed billions of yuan in objection projects, deployed tax
motivator, and issued licenses that accept the business to engage in actions that
were previously prohibited, such as marketing comparatively fresh wastewater
(‘grey water’).[38] A worldwide linkage strategy for the
circular economy must consider the following five steps: a
international database and initial funding, a worldwide platform, transnational
alliances, regulation for operations,
structures to modulate disputes, and sanctions on a international scale.[39] Although coordinate system and worldwide
conceptions are positioning epoch-making objection to the effectiveness
of a circular economy, there are possibilities to
transformation from a linear framework of material and energy flows, regarding innovations in technology and policy
capabilities. Disregarding
numerous economic, environmental, and social disputes, the harmonization and sympathy of corrections with plans of
action in Northeast Asia are required in the circular economy policy
so that the changes and editing of circular economy execution in China, Japan, and South Korea can be achieved without delay.[40] For example, bridging
the carbon market of China, Japan, and South Korea will
drive them into more valuable diplomatic relations from economic,
environmental, and strategical perspectives through linking strategies.[41]
Moreover, according to the
Asian Disaster Reduction Center, disasters like intensive floods, storms, and earthquakes have been
occurring during the past 30 years (1990-2019) on average in the Asian region.[42] China, Japan, and South Korea have accepted
a cooperative statement on disaster reaction for the sustainable enforcement of
the Sendai Framework measures to improve reaction to natural disasters,
educational
exchange of endangerment reduction, and
response measures.[43] Measures to reduce vulnerability and
administration at the national, local, and community levels have been already kicked off for discussion.[44]
In addition, Northeast Asian Counter-Disaster Relief Task Force comprising
response forces, medical corps, and NGOs could be institutionalized to cope
with earthquakes, typhoons, and ferry sinking.
4.2.2. Cultural Community
Despite the unresolved historical issues in Northeast Asia,
the disorder in the region today is not a reaction of hostility like the
Hobbesian perspective but a response of competition like the Lockean one, which
proves that the war, nuclear explosion, and security spirals may be preventable
with appropriate sympathy to the matters such as historical criticisms, doubts
over China’s upsurge and the US’s role in Northeast Asia, the North Korean
nuclear problem and others.[45] From a normative perspective, three
methods of territorial rights can specify the issue entitled to them, including
the functional view from Hobbesian and Lockean ideas of state, or the
culturalist tactic based on the synergetic relations industrialized between
cultural clusters and region in a procedure of substantial and figurative value
gaining, as well as the nationalist view that distinguishes the position of
culture as part of the creative development of the rights, weighting the
implication of a dogmatic
individuality definition as in nations.[46] For example, over the past two decades,
Japan’s prevalent culture were
tremendously spread and exhausted throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia
through a broad range of artistic
commodities such as music songs,
animation
works, comics, television shows, fashion publications, and films
recognized by resident prevalent culture markets and now establish a
fundamental part of the cultural lives of numerous young generations in this region and have a determining factor
on the manner young municipal customers visualize and reflect about Japan.[47] For another
example, the
accomplishment of Korean cultural goods around the world tracks from diverse
distribution stories as an Asia, Korean TV dramas and K-pop demonstrate a
composed advance between Asian traditional values and modernity, and this
strengthens and combines the cultural distinctiveness of Asians as Asians.[48]
Looking back over the last 30 years, culture as a defining aspect of
international relations in Asia has been in retreat. The standard International
Relations (IR) analytic framework highlights the authority, state interests,
and the balance of power. However, non-Western International Relations see
culture as a distinguished conceptualization.[49]
Based on the chief and
subordinate historical data, many projecting theorists in Japan and China used
nationalist rational division to shape original viewpoints for example, modern
Japanese philosophers who definite homegrown reasonableness, epistemology, and
judgment as aesthetical, spiritual, expressive, and designated native ontology
in terms of emptiness, as well as contemporary Chinese scholars who theorized indigenous logicalness,
philosophy, and logic in ethical-practical support and branded native ontology
as this-worldly and doctrine.[50] Cultivating the dyadic cultures, including
China-Japan-South Korea-North Korea,
encompassing the region’s interactive culture, either Lockean or Kantian,
creates conceivable and superior regional cooperation.
Moreover, boosting religious collaboration
can help to develop a cultural foundation for communication and unabridged
flows of cultural values, which can bring people closer. Of great importance is
the solid basis of Buddhist connections between China, Japan, the two Koreas,
and the United States.[51] As current studies on Korean Buddhism showed, the
cultural flow was not unidirectional from the periphery to the center but there were cases of Korea influencing China too.[52] The US saw its first Buddhist temple in 1853 when
the Sze Yap Company – a Chinese Buddhist fraternal group – built one in San Francisco, with the second one
coming through a common effort of Asian (Chinese and Japanese) immigrants who
came for work in America.[53] Harmony
as a compulsory stipulation
for territorial incorporation could help catalyse the deteriorated debates
about the profitable accumulation and encompasses its inter-lacing constructive
function for intra-regional operation.[54]
Leadership success is diverse across cultures despite China,
Japan, and Korea being measured as the Confucian Asia cluster, and their
cultural value transformation can be principally explicated by diverse
financial stimuli in these three countries.[55] Confucian values
intrinsic in the Northeast Asian countries have been obliged as the ethical code
for the speedy economic evolution of this domain since the 1960s and will shape
the groundwork of Northeast Asian values in the future with
their contribution to established economic integration.[56] However, the US plays a vital role in Asia
though American cultural spacing from Asia shows little
public reinforcement and apprehension of its demand on American foreign strategies in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the US needs to overcome
the limitation of the ominous US budget
shortfall, which
reduces the support
essential to invest
offshore harmonizing[57] for recalling
strong penta-cultural relations in Northeast Asia to resolve regional
disorders.
4.2.3.
Quadrilateral Strategic Talks on Taiwan
and Korean Issues
The United States and China are inseparably sealed in the
Pacific Rim’s structure of international trade, which might make war less
possible. However, others voiced concern over the inevitability of a world war
due to the issues of Taiwan, and North Korea, disputes in the East and South
China Seas as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border.[58]
The quadrilateral strategic talks on security involving
China and the United States, along with the Two Koreas, for better security
cooperation need to be institutionalized. One
sensitive issue should be highlighted and resolved regarding how the divided
nations can become unified again peacefully. Any
step in this direction should be made in such a manner that not only leaders
but also the two countries’ people and institutions
could contribute to it.[59] When it comes to the Taiwan question, as countries including the US
excavate bonds with the self-governing
island, Beijing is using armed and other resources to declare its territorial
entitlements since China requests the world to distinguish it is ‘not going to
get pushed around’ on Taiwan’ on October 20, 2021. Notably, the progression of integration
will have to be kept flexible to be realistic. For example, the distance from
the present two states of both South and North Korea to a future possible one-state
formula must be viewed as a continuum, not a sudden jump.[60]
Therefore, quadrilateral strategic
talks on security are urgent and important in the region, stressing procedural,
material, and ideational resolutions learned from the three stages of
reconciliation after a violent conflict between Japan and Korea, also Europe
after the war.[61]
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The case of the European Union has shown that the
road to integration is not an easy one, but not impossible either, and should start with minilateralism.
There are implications to be learned from the EU’s experiences, from both
negative and positive outcomes. For that, four stages of regional growth toward
integration have been investigated. Stage One comprises the creation of
economic, non-security, and political mini-lateral agreements, partially
achieved through the Trilateral Cooperative Secretariat and RCEP. Stage Two
represents building upon minilateralism to create
broader multilateral partnerships and, ultimately, more permanent institutions.
This will naturally lead to Stage Three - the existence of a shared vision and
goals. Lastly, Stage Four would mean countries in Northeast Asia have strong
regional cooperation on multiple levels and can act outside the region as a
common block.
It is worth pointing out that there is no need to
struggle with finding new collaboration methods. The existing agreements can be
successfully used to build something bigger gradually, like the RCEP in the
economic sector and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation on the security level.
Considering all the above, the visualization of the
future desirable mini-multilateralism should emphasize ideology, security,
circular economy and counter-disaster
relief task force, cultural community, and quad-strategic talks.
Moreover, a regional organization for security cooperation in Northeast Asia
needs to be established as the end state of mini-multilateralism involving six
or more parties since China’s
upsurge has shaped “three paradoxes of security, institution and power” in the
region forming the geopolitical and geo-economics scenery of Northeast Asia in
the post-Cold War period and implicating regional order in the future,
divergent to concepts advocated by the theory of economic interdependence and peace.[62]
To solve the Northeast Asia safety dilemma,
respective paths
need to be seized to lessen territorial tensions, but improving U.S.- China connections
is the most important and critical:
first, the nations
participating ought to forthright
encounter their histories, even as they anticipate the future; secondly, a Cold
War mentality must be dispensed and seek mutually secure security; thirdly, it
is crucial to strengthen multi-level conversations
and to reduce the endangerment of misestimation; finally, China-U.S. relations
must be reinforced, with greater practice
of collaboration.[63]
A comprehensible approach for desirable mini-multilateralism needs to be
developed as Northeast Asia security regime architecture involving strategic
economic dialogues.[64]
For
international organizations, Structural Industry, and Innovation Policy (SIIP) need to be emphasized. In industrialized countries, routing technological
revolution in a track that is a friendlier to the
environment and social welfare
ought to be a crucial component of innovative
industrial plans of action and in rising economies, industrial policy impressively fit to their possess stages of development such as assisting
defenseless groups, gender equality, concentrated relic energy usage or the circular technologies for novel categories of agriculture, housing,
and transport.[65]
Global accomplishment of urbanization and farming improvement in the past years has significantly environmental impacts on the proportional business sectors, considering Northeast Asia and China-Russia Economic Corridor.[66] Policies on global and regional corridors for development need to be established continuously because of the economic and cultural recovery during and after the post-pandemic period, based on the new RCEP in force connecting the previous Transit Trade Corridors (TTCs).[67]
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
None.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
None.
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